The effectiveness of QE2 by James Bullard
T
he federal funds rate has been close to 
zero since December 2008, when the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
voted to reduce the target to between  
0 percent and 0.25 percent.  With its policy 
rate near the zero bound, the FOMC turned 
to large-scale asset purchases (so-called 
quantitative easing) as economic conditions 
warranted further action.  Quantitative eas-
ing was successful and showed that the Fed 
can conduct effective policy even with the  
fed funds rate near zero.
The FOMC’s first quantitative easing  
program, which began in late 2008 and  
ended in the first quarter of 2010, consisted  
of purchases of agency debt, agency 
mortgage-backed securities and longer-
term Treasury securities.  The program is 
generally considered to have been success-
ful in further easing monetary conditions.  
Throughout the spring of 2010, however, 
financial market stress in the U.S. increased 
again, mostly in response to an intensifica-
tion of the European sovereign debt crisis.
During the summer of 2010, the pace 
of the U.S. economic recovery slowed.  In 
addition, inflation and expected inflation 
were both quite low—some measures were 
as low as they had been in 50 years.  Infla-
tion, while still positive, had been trending 
downward (which is known as disinflation) 
throughout the first half of 2010.  As the 
Japanese experience over the past 15 years 
has shown, having mild deflation (i.e., declin-
ing prices) along with a near-zero policy rate 
can lead to poor economic outcomes, and the 
situation is difficult to escape.
1, 2  Avoiding a 
similar experience in the U.S. was one of the 
primary motivations for a second round of 
quantitative easing.
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke gave a speech 
in Jackson Hole, Wyo., on Aug. 27, 2010, in 
which he first indicated that a second asset-
purchase program may be needed.  At the 
Nov. 2-3 meeting, the FOMC made the deci-
sion to purchase Treasury securities at a pace 
of about $75 billion per month through the 
first half of 2011 for a total of $600 billion— 
the program commonly known as QE2.
3
The policy change was largely priced into 
the markets ahead of the November FOMC 
meeting, as financial markets are forward-
looking.  The financial market effects of QE2 
were entirely conventional.  In particular, 
real interest rates declined, expected inflation 
increased, the dollar depreciated and equity 
prices rose.  The purchases of longer-term 
Treasury securities essentially lowered the 
risk-free real interest rate, which then caused 
some investors to switch to riskier assets—
most notably U.S. equity markets, but also 
emerging market equities and commodities 
as an investment class—in search of higher 
rates of return.
Following the November decision, many 
people expected the program to have no 
impact.  Some even went so far as to say  
that purchasing $7 trillion in longer-term 
bonds was necessary.  But based on the 
fairly substantial financial market impact  
of $600 billion in purchases, those views 
have been dispelled.
While the effects on financial markets 
occurred during the run-up to the November 
decision, effects on the real economy (e.g., 
consumption and employment) are expected 
to occur six to 18 months after the monetary 
policy action, as is the case with conven-
tional monetary policy.  Determining exactly 
which movements in real variables are due to 
monetary policy and which ones are due to 
other influences on the economy that occur 
in the meantime can be difficult.  Disentan-
gling these effects is a standard problem in 
monetary policy analysis.  However, the real 
effects of the asset-purchase program will 
most likely be conventional, just as the finan-
cial market effects were.
As the experience with quantitative easing 
has shown, monetary policy can be effective 
even when nominal interest rates are at the 
zero bound.  QE2 was successful as a classic 
James Bullard, President and CEO
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
The Effectiveness of QE2 
PRESidEnt’S mESSagE
ENDNOTES
 1  For more discussion, see Bullard, James.  “Seven 
Faces of ‘The Peril.’ ”  Federal Reserve Bank of  
St. Louis Review, September/October 2010, Vol. 92,  
No. 5, pp. 339-52.
 2  Also, see Hursey, Tim; and Wolman, Alexander L.  
“Monetary Policy and Global Equilibria in a Produc-
tion Economy.”  Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 
Economic Quarterly, Fourth Quarter 2010, Vol. 96, 
No. 4, pp. 317-37.  
 3  See Bullard, James.  “QE2 in Five Easy Pieces.”  Speech 
at the High Profile Speaker Series, New York Society 
of Security Analysts, New York City, Nov. 8, 2010.
 4  Research at the St. Louis Fed suggests that quantita-
tive easing programs in the U.S. can have interna-
tional effects (e.g., a reduction in long-term foreign 
bond yields), as well.  See Neely, Christopher J.  “The 
Large-Scale Asset Purchases Had Large Interna-
tional Effects.”  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Working Paper 2010-018C, January 2011.
easing of monetary policy in that the imprint 
on the financial markets looked just like a 
standard, aggressive monetary policy easing.
4  
Furthermore, the disinflationary trend of 
2010 has apparently been reversed, and the 
U.S. economy seems to have avoided the 
Japanese-style outcome.  Although a rule-
like approach would have been preferable 
from my point of view, rather than indepen-
dent, isolated decisions with large amounts 
of purchases, the impact of quantitative 
easing on macroeconomic and financial 
conditions showed that the Fed has plenty 
of ammunition to carry out stabilization 
policy even when the policy rate cannot be 
lowered further. 
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